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RECENT IMPORTANT DECISIONS.

ATTORNEY AND CLIENT—EXEMPTION OF NON-RESIDENT ATTORNEY FROM SERVICE.—Where a non-resident plaintiff in an action pending in the United States Court for the Southern District of Iowa employed an attorney who resided in Illinois, the question was whether such attorney was exempt from service of process in a civil suit while in attendance on court and for a reasonable time thereafter. *Held*, that he was thus exempt. *Read v. Neff et al.* (1913) 207 Fed. 890.

At common law the rule was that an attorney while in attendance on court was exempt from arrest on civil process, but this exemption did not extend to the service of process which did not involve arrest. 3 BLACKSTONE, COMM. 289; *Greenleaf v. Peoples Bank*, 133 N. C. 298, 98 Am. St. Rep. 709, 63 L. R. A. 499. There are a few courts which have extended this exemption in the case of non-resident attorneys to the service of ordinary civil process. *Hoffman v. Bay Circuit Judge*, 113 Mich. 109; *Commonwealth v. Ronald*, 4 Call. (Va.) 97; *Whitman v. Sheets*, 20 O. C. C. 1, 11 O. C. D. 179. In *Central Trust Co. v. Milwaukee St. Ry. Co.*, 74 Fed. 442 it was held that a non-resident attorney was exempt from the service of a subpoena for witness duty. It is submitted that the cases which announce the contrary rule are more in accord with the theory upon which exemptions are founded. The courts have always maintained that exemptions were allowed because they were absolutely necessary in order that justice might not be impeded. It was for this reason that it was not permissible to arrest an attorney while engaged in court. On the other hand the service of ordinary civil process in no way prevents the attorney from performing his duties. It does not seem reasonable that one class of persons should be less amenable to the courts than other classes whose business within the state may be just as urgent and to whom freedom from suit in a foreign jurisdiction would be just as great a boon. For a full discussion of the subject see *Greenleaf v. Peoples Bank*, *supra*, Also *Tyrone Bank v. Doty*, 12 Pa. Co. Ct. 287; *Robbins v. Lincoln*, 27 Fed. 342.

AUTOMOBILES—RIGHT OF OWNER TO RECOVER FOR INJURY TO UNREGISTERED MACHINE.—In a suit to recover for the negligent injury to an automobile, the failure to have the machine registered was interposed as a defense. A statute made it unlawful for an unregistered automobile to be on the highway. *Held*, that failure to register is no defense. *Birmingham Ry., Lt. & Power Co. v. Aetna Acc. & L. Ins. Co.* (Ala. 1913) 64 So. 44.

The precise question is presented for the first time in this jurisdiction, although the court follows its earlier construction of a similar statute, making unlawful the presence of straying cattle on the highway. *A. G. S. R. Co. v. McAlpine*, 71 Ala. 545. The cases in the other states are in conflict. Those in accord with the instant case take the position that in order to bar recovery, the failure to register must have some causal connection with the injury. *Atlantic C. L. Ry. v. Weir*, 63 Fla. 69, 41 L. R. A. (N. S.) 307; *Lindsay v.*